Until litigation reaches th e point where both sides are willing to listen to data, so much so that states actively monitor themselves and th at plaintiffs concede when sophisticated data deny genuine differences, plaintiffs and states and children will suffer equally in lengthy and expensive litigation, , tntroduction
In rece nt yea rs, sc hoof finance litigatio n has oominated tho ug ht among theorists and ..... semchefS interested in \I>e pubtic po licy dimensions of fisca l suppo rt lor educati on, Nearly every state has experle..::ed liti gation. and in many instances ..... peated attacks on state funding methocts fOf public e lementary and secondary educat ion have o cc urred, In some instances , litigalion has represe nted emergeooe of m;xe sophisticated thooght about eq ua l education at o pporturlity. whi le in othe r in sta..::es controve rsy has returned again a oo again as com pl ia..::e titiga1ion has soughl to e nforce ea rlier coort rulings Thorooghly il ustrated in the ~te r al ur e, these compla ints ha v~ fol lowed a distiOCl panern 01 argument as p la intiffs have i .
leged that states have not met th eir conSlitutionat ob~ga t i oo to provide high q ua.ty educat>ona l oppo~unity to atl ch ikiran withoot regard to local weallh and $choa l diWic1 boundaries.' Although p la in l iffs have a rgued with .ary ing <:leg r .... s 01 sv::cess in the many state courts , they repeatadly seek to lest ju dicia l sympathy in oow settings and at new lime s in r;slory. Afthough settings and co oo itions constantly char>ge. th e arguments a ..... oft"" fhe same , creatin g an unceasing challenge for defenda nts who must bala nce t he de li cate mix between the grim realities of limited state tw.ldgets a nd plainti"s' successes in som~ states that have gene ra lly aided a cl imate of fiscal reform mome ntum, Such w as rece ntry lhe case in Montana Rural Educalion Associafion v Stale' where pfaintiffs contended that l he liscat a mounts a ll oc ated 10 th e pta intiff sch oo l dislricts ", .. OOnies certain stude nt eq ua lity of OOUcati Ollal opportu nity, ... and eq ual protection 01 the laws."' Specificaly , the pla intiffs comen ded th at '
la) The classifications a nd fuooing levets provided in the foondation program sched uies a re a rbitrary , with no ratic ",t and educaliona ll y-r~at ed basis . Additi Olla lly , t h~ amounts a ll ocated Ihroogh th a foundation prog ram have bee n. a nd continue to be, less than ne~ded to fund publiC elementary and secondary 9dJcation at the levels require d by the State of Montana sufficient to provk\e equat educatOonat opportunities; Ib) Ba<;ause fhey a ..... arbitrary and not based o n educationa l y-reiated detOOT1 inations of 0000 , lhe fCUldation program scheduies fa~ to reflect the costs of provk1ing educationat opportunities to stlK1ents in ru ra l elementary and secondary scOOol ctslricts in Montana: Ie) TMe etig ibility formu la tor GTB aid is biased against sma ll er, rurat scho," districts , a nd in favor of ta rger, oon-rura l districts, As a result. rural school districts are significantly less like ly to qualify fo r Guara nteed Tax Base aid tha n are "",-(Uraf school ctstrict3: Id) Add iticna~y, the distri butiOll form ula for determini ng the amount of GTB a id for q ualifying diSlriclS is b iased against smatler ru ra l diSlricts, a nd favOfs la rge r. noorura l d istricts. As a resull , even lhoug h a rural d istrict may q u a~fy for GTB aid , the amou nt it rOOilives is disproportionately smaM compared to the amount th at is distributed to a quai l yng f1Or>-rura l district; (e) As a result of the funding ir>eqUities ""scrbed. stLKlanls in rural school d istricts a r~ not afforded equ al ed ucatio na l o ppOrtooiti es; and II) Montana's school f inar>ee system in gene ra l, arid the fou ndalion p rog ram classi fic ations and fu nd in g ineqtities. in particuar, adversely a" ect th e quafity of educ ation affo rded to students in th e ptaint iff sc hoo l districls,'
These plaintiff claims a re represe ntali.e of arid consisten1 with the broad contexi of 9C000I fi ",nee equity i tigation th at has c h a racteri~ed the last throo decaOOs in the fiscal policy a rena.
Alth oug h th 0 facts were sp-ecific 10 one slate, \I>e broader q uesti ons of co nslitutiona l equity a nd so un d fi na""" theo ry were
Educatiooai Considerations I I &gain railed because tt>e $late Qf Mootana was tJe;ng c:he~ Iet"IJO' d tQ .how mat its SlatutQoy scheme la, linaneong P<..tIIc eWc:a.bQn cId not VIOlate equal 0ppQftunity as defined in 00fl3CI.
IlJllonal and heal Ih.a<y As in IM!rf 0Ihe, state ""' ere chaI1tonge&1\avoe ~. !he question lor the court . -in whe!hef Ihe pmcfllle <If ..... ad educalional oppoo1un"Y if unrtormrv """,atiOOai, and whethe, IKJJaIizaoon can be HMId wt.en O~· !anini .... C08IS <If ~ delivery "''' crit tho&9 ,~ated 10 enrolmen1 and $iu <If !he district, ralhe< than e'IOl'flde<lIO in. dude pialr'llilf$' d,im <If othe, attribotabl& costs '''lating tQ eonnomo= end ~apNc fact"", a!!ec!ing tho ac1ual price 01 edu' c:a.ti<)n' As wch. the,""" " blIr beocame woolher the Montane l in.ance IQI'mula I\aO 8d\ieved lui equ~~, sa1islactQl'i" addr_ ifIg the inte nt 01 eq ualization and ilquita~le l irl,,,,<:,"9 in th" modOlrn coote.t of equa l opportunity.
Ohen Ignored in the mod0rn frenzy of reform litiQatlon.
I'Iowo:we<. Is the Q\>&9tioo 01 whett>e, statas are SSSlM'l1ed .,.oity 01 inequitable t,eatment of ctriId reo. The u!eratu,e oItOl'fl !fumpets the relarm agend.1o as if sud> COIlCIusiot1 WIlr" naliJo'ally true, ... 1Il IitUe oppoo1unily klr deloodanl.$ 10 0/1 ... !hel, IIIews in a r"necti-..e clilooourse. Since !he root <If COIltfCMIfS) ' (e618 on::es between theSe grDI4IS ..... 100 to k91imate purposes.
Ihe IormuIa ""'I' beOOmt SU$llOCl. Maasuring w&a/tI'r neul.ality !hus Iorms a central fe_ 01 !hIS e"""'tnation 01 MonIana's tdIooIlinance plan.
The hnal standerd 01 ta.<Payer equity oon<:tJd&I tI1e equoty argument aM see!<s equal lreatment by quest"""ng the tlila' tions/1 ip between ta. yield and eq ual tax effort. II one ectIooI district can po'oWc8 higr.e r tax yield w ith 10)'$ tax efl ort rha n an· other .choo l district wh ich ca n""t reach Ihat leve l with out highe r tax rates and therefore an unequa l tax burden. th e 1ilc. "'" The mean is a measure of the cent ra l tendertey of the dislribution of observations. It represents the averaqe value in a distributio n of a variable The mea n takes into account a ll observations in th e d istributi<Jn . The mean of each variabte examined was cak;ulated with the folk>wing formula, IX.; N woo", I is tile sum 01 all distrcts. >"; is the value of a given vari· ab~ in distrCt i. and N is the nu mberof districts,
~"" The range is the d ifle rence between the highest and lowest observations in a distributio n, The sma ller lhe value of the range, the smaller the variation in lhe distrib ution of a give n variable, The smalle r the variation, l he better the assurnad eq.
uity of a distrib ution. As a measure of equ ity, lhe usefutoess of the range is lim ited. It is based 00 only two values. does oot;o. dicate the pattern of variation. nor is it se nsitive to changes within llle distribtJ1ion . Nooethe1ess, th e range is highly useful in assessing d isparity. T he range of selected variables in Mon· tana was calculaled with the folowing fOfm ula:
where X. is the variable considered in <istrict i.
Restricfed Range
The r<l$trictoo range islhe difference between the observation al the 95th percentile of the distributi()ll arod the 5th pe rcent'e, Doo to th e se nsitivity of the range to e'treme values, the resl rictoo ran~e e lim inat<l$ values bek>w the 5th perce nti le arod above the 95th peroontile, The smaller th e value 01 the restrc ted range, the sma'''' the variutioo in the <istribution 01 a give n variable per district, The smaller th~ variation , the better the equity of the distribo1ion , However, ~ke the range. the r& stricted range is subject to the same lim itations as a measure 01 equ ity. The restricted range was used in examining Montana's fisca l profile arod was calculated with the fol k>wing formuta:
>"; at 95 perce ntile -X; at 5 percentile where X, was the variable considered in district i.
Varianc8
The variance is the average 01 the squared OOviations from the mean, The smaller the value of the variance. the smal er th e
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variatk>n in the distribution of a given varlabte. The smal er th e .ariatk>n, the better lhe eq Uity of a distributicn . IP, IX, ->";)'; IP, w/)era I is the s'-"" of pupi ls in a l districts, P, is number of stude nts in district i. x" is lhe mean e' pe nd iture per pupil for al pupils, and X, is the ex p~nditur e pe r pup~ in d istr>::t i
Standard D6viation
T he starldard deviation is th e squa re root of the .arianc9.
T1>e smaller the value of the standard deviati()ll . the smaller the vanation in the distribution per pupi l pef distr>ct . The smalle r the variation. the bett", the ~q u ity of a distritluti<Jn , The adva ntage of th e standard delliatk>n is lhat all observutioos are included in the calculatk>n aM the units of measurement are in the original scale . However. it is sensttive to outliers, The standard devia,. tion lormed a central aspect of evaluating Montana's equity per· forma.-.ce and was calcutated as the square root 01 the variance as pre>iously discussed using the folkl'M ng formuta:
' IP, (X, -X,), I LP
Coemcient of Variation
The coeff;;;ient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the mea n, or the square rOO! Ollhe vanartee dMded by tI1e mean. It is e<pressed as the ratio 01 the standard devlatk>n of the d istrii>uti()ll to the mean of the distribution. The smalle r the val"" of th e cooff~t of va riation, the smalle r th e varlatk>n in t he dist rib ution of some variable per p upi l pe r d istrict. The smaler the variation, the beMr th e equity 01 the distri bution, It is sensitive to ootliers b ut not to changes in scale. The cootflcient 01 vafiation was utiizOO in axamining M()Iltana's equity prof,e arid was cakoutated with the following form ula:
" (IP, IX, -x,r; IP,)IX. where X. is the mean expenditure per pupil for all ctislr>cts,
McLoone In"""
The M<;l(X>lle Index is the ratio of tI1e sum of expenditufGS pe r district fOf all districts bek>w the media n to the sum ot expend iture. that woukj be requ ired if aM d istricts beicw the me· dian were brought up to the median levet of expenditure. The ia rge r the value of th e Mel"""'" Index, the closer the low", half of the <iWihuti ()ll is to the median of the distriootion. Usually this index has a .aloe between 0 and 1: however, if the group of districts (e,g .. a selected subgroup as opposed 10 the entire distributi<Jn) w ing compa red were to ha_e a mean value close to the median, this vaio.la can be g reater than 1 The Mel"""", Index formed a central asp-ect of evaluating the weal!h ne utrality standard aM was caiculated with the fottowing formula ' 1(1,. ,;1 P,>";I M, I( I " ,11 P, whare districts 1 through I am beiow lhe median. I is the SIJffi of pupils in al <istricts 1 lhrough}. P, is the number pupi ls in district i, X. is the ~xpe n o it u"" per pupi l in district i, aM M, is the median expenditu r~ per pupi l fur al districts.
Gini Coefficient
Tile Gini coefficient indicates how far lhe distribution of expenditures is from providir>g each percentage of st.....oonts with the same percootage of e><penditllll!s, T he smal er the value of th e Gin i coefficie nt, the more equ itable the di st ri bution of expend itures in providing a specil led percentage of students with the same percentage 01 experod itures. r. 1:
where L is the sum lor all pupils in districts iaoo district i. P, is the number 01 pupils in districl i, P J is the number of pupils in dlstrkOl/, X, is the eXP<l nditure P<lr pupil in district i. X; is the ex-I>"nditure I>" r pupi l in district i, and X. is the mean expenditu r~ I>"r pup~ for all districts. The foregoing measu res were usefu l in assessir>g iJ.oth too resource accessibWity and wealth neutrality staooards by deal· ing with \he dispersioo or va riation of single variables. Other meaSu res were also used, however, to describe relationshipS iJ.ctwoon two va riables and were regression·based measures. Correlations and slol>"s were two such regression'based meaSures used to exam ine Montana'S aid formula,
Sim~ Correlation
Simple correlation describes the oogree to whkoh two variables are aSsOOated, In the present Sl udy the two main variables were wea lth (mill value) in each school district and the corre.ponding e.penditure I>"r pupil. In the study 01 schoo fina""",. these two variables are often used to descfbe the fiscal neutral ity of a state school finar.ce system. A system that is fisca lly neutral is generaly able to show very low relationship 00-twaO<! wealth and pupi l revenuele'peoo iture.
The correlat ion coefficient has values that range from ·1 .0 to ~1 ,0, When two variables are positively associated, larger values of one tend to 00 accompani~d by larger value. of the other. Conversely, whe~ two variables are negati.e ly re· lated, larger values in one moo to be accompanied by srnalier vakJes of the other. A .al"" of ~ 1.0 indicates a pe~ed positive linear relationship and a val"" of·l ,0 a pe~ed negali.e linear relationship . A va lue of 0 indicates no linear re lationship between the tvo'o va riables, As a measu re of fiscal nootrality, a cor· relation cOOlfflclent 01 0 woold indicate no linear relationship between the two variables. In assessing Montana's aid scheme, !tie sim ple ""n elation was foond by the Pear$()f1 correlalion coefficient and was calcliated using the folklwing formula:
where L is the sum of pupils in all districts. P, is the number of pupi ls in district i, X. is the eXP<lnditures P<lr pup~ in district I, X is the mean expenditures I>"r pupil for al districts, W, is the 8 wealth pe r pupil in district i, and W is the mean wealth 1>'" pupl for an dislricts These fundamental tools formed the basis for assessif'l\l resource accessihi.ty, wealth neutrality, and by inference tax yield in Monlana, The resu lts of the analySiS we,e re",;ewed by the court in the re<;ord wherein defendants were able to reo spooo to plaint;ffs' daims of fOOl1u la-based ineq uity, Results 01 the AnalySis" Resource Accessibility nor>pllIinIiIhi wen! "xpeo:;ted Imm !herr large< ANUs. "'-". !he larger AH6lIlor IIOI'Cll8inblis led 10 tower ",""rage P<I" pupil "". ~_ , TlI9$e ~ndr0g6 __ " consistenl _!he Pl'!lem "'" peel..:! on !he basil of r~a! iOIlslli ps of Itlese va!ialll<ls !Q AN!! in l he 0."r8 11 tl81t fummary as seen prevlOU$ ly in Table! , Deeper examinalion, however, revealed I hal differences be· twee n pla in tilts arid t'IO npla inlil ts were not necessa ri ly pre· ReIuIts 01 raoge measures uat.lln,ng wealth (mill """" per JlI4)iI) and experdtu'es par JlI4)iI are reported In Table 5 AI analYSIS by these data IhOWfd. unrestricted ranges o t theM variables were "".ewclftt>y. Plaimilt districts had greater a-.ge weaM pe< pu~t ($60,25) !han was true!or"!he< the state ($44.84). non·~ai nMfs (S38.Q4), or for the oompa~1Of1 nonj)laintiff 11''''4' (S4t. (J.4) As may be s-e&n trom the analysis in Table 7 , plaimiN di$- posit"" in the distribution ber:ause it was nQt ~rovable that hlghe' weallh districlS had Increased per pupif I'xpend~u",s las1er !han low weaI1h <ls1ricfs as !here _ 00 S18tis1ical .,.,;- As "taled eallief. ttl'e<:! conditions of equ,ty had 10 be met in !his analysis it !he 'tale aid lo~a we-r& 10 bfI judo;Jod ""-'1-able. The formula ptlsHd the first standard ot fIl$O<J rCII accessibilil~ In thaI expendilur" were based 00 8 lIChema 01 enrol· men! categorie$ thai did no! fIl';U~ in an unaoceplabla variation of tunda. The seccnd 61andard 01 wealth AI'U1rality tolowed closely •• equiriig!ha11he relationship befwtIerI we;o/Ih and expendih.oe bfI at laast a neutral, d not irrverH. CO'o'IIfianl As 8 _ I nalural byproduct oI........tIh neutrality. Ia-.::pay$' 9Q-,",I~ can also btl delem"lin&d. While ~ shOuld be clearly stated thai the successful ac!1ievemenl ot' any 0I'l8 slandard is ort"" " suff",ient to cast shadows on plaintiff arguments concerning the operation of a fDllll ula atld its credibility, it was nonetheless 00-sirable to contiooe in tl1is analysis by assessit>g wealth neutrality in Ofder to mOfe ful ly jUdge the relationshi p betwee n wealth (mil l value) and expenditures available to each studenl, i.e., a measure of educatllnal opportunity It was obse ..... able on its face that e xpenditu res por pupi l n Montana were posit i"ely re lated to local wea lth suc h that poorer d istricts sometimes had lower e xp ond iture leve ls, In fact, as seen n Fig ure 1 lhe correlat"'" betWOOl1 expend iture per pupil and mil value per pupi l was 0,25 statewide, 0.289 !Of pla intiff districts, 0,194 for oonpla intiH districts, a nd 0 ,178 for the matched comparison 1,II"0lIP. Whi le ~ was correct to obse ..... e that these relationships we re posilive in " rectioo atld imp lied t hat gr<late r wea llh per pupi l corre late s unfavo rab ly wit h greater experlditures per p upil, these relationsh ips were very Regression Summa,y EXP!P VS. MILVALUE/ANB small , PMic ula rly gi.e n the un evenooss of such pheoomena as judged ...-.:le, tM resource accessibitity standard. As seen in Figura I, th e R squared value indrnted the a mount 0/ variabi lity of expendHure per pupi l statistically explainable by the wealth of a distr>ct, For example, clespite a posilille correlat"'" between wealth and expenditure for the state as a whole, only 6.n {R' . 0.(02) of variation in expenditure pe r p up~ could be explaine<! by weaHh in any given " str>ct . It then foliowed thai 94% 01 this " fference was explained by other lactors. E.en the sightly hig he r level of expiained "aria""" fo r plaintiffs (8 .4%) was very klw . Importantly, fOf nonplainliff districts {3,5%) and matched groups (2 .9%) the effect 0/ waa lth On the level of per pupi l expenditu re was almost ne gligible. As a classic measure 0/ wealth neutra lity, thew correlations and variance in expendi· ture explained by wealth (as mil va lue per p upil) irldkoated a relati.ely wealth·ne utral situatioo .
Howeve r. tests for wealth oo utralily sl>::luld also be intereste<! oot ooly in access to wealth by district based 00 the number of stude nts, b ut a lso based on the amount of revenue a local d istrict could generate in support fo r its edocationa l prol,II"am, In order to address this iss ,"" it was necessary to consieler \he strength 0/ i nkages between wealth a nd expenditures per pupi l in the state as a whole arid within each of the n divid· ual g roups to mOfe fully judge the lev~ 0/ wea lth neutrality. If Educational Considerations 9 As eoq>ected. reg.ess,on analysiol lOt pla,nl,!1 di&V'::,1 ito 4.558 mil ls. However, the reverse was true for k::>cal permanent millag~ rates. Plaintiffs had a rate appro,imately one-half of the rate for the remaining g roups (8 .976) compared to "'-"l!Iaintiffs (16.43) . At first analysis it appeared that taxpayers in plaintiff dis· tricts in l act did exM greate r enoo at the local .00ed Ie.~ tha n dK:f other diS1ncts in the state . This result wookj be expected in districts "'1M sig nificantly highe r expend itures and s ign if~nt ly lower wealth. However, this was not the case in Montana since \here was 00 statistically sig n i f~t difference betwoo n totaf mi laqe paid by ta.payers in plaintiff districts compared to ~uin tiff distr"'s . As seen in Table 13 , th e p value was 0.1927 am even though pia inti If. had a n a.erage 3.858 g rM ter mi ll IGvy lhan ~ainliffs. this 1e"",1 was sma l and was oot statisticaty signilicant As a resull, ~ cooid be confklenUy sakj that taxpayers in al districts pakj s<milar taxes for the support of sclYXlis.
Atthough th e sccooo issue of differentia l tax rates was ~an ingful ly addressed while answering the first question, addit>onat a na lysis was condL!CIad as seen in Tab le s 14 and 15.
From the&"> data, several observations were made. Most importantly, w ithin the 'JOO"'al fuoo the total tax effons (voted and permssive) of the various gro",," eotAd be seen to be q uite sim i ar.
As shown in Table 14 , the differ"""" between plaintilt d istricts (2{ eral fl.<'id mi llage than either the state as a whole orthe g ro up 01 equ;ty such as k::>caty voted mi llages . a persiS1ent equity question has a lways tro ubled schola rs about w hethe r fiscal dilferences may be assumed to create d ifferential el leets . Although the question is .astly OCI!11>Iex and has ne"", r been slJC""SSI~l y disentangled. it was oocessary and possible in this instance to dete rmi ne whethe r th e small ditferences did ha"", a negative ef· leet 00 expertd itu re levels ot p la intiff districts which subsequenlly could influence the etfecliveness of their operation. OM analysis which can be used to determ ine whe1her lhese differences had a substa ntia l effeet on e'penditure patterns for local schoo! di.tr""s is to in.estigate respective 1cvels of budget surplus lor plaintiff aoo nonplaintiff g ro ups. For purpooos of satislying this nagging question in Montana, the 1(192 budget surr"us was cak;ulatad as a perc<>ntage 01 tota l ~LKlget tor each district aoo reported as a perC<>ntage 01 total l.l"ne ra l fund 1>udget. The reS~1$ 01 the C()(Jlp (Irison am reportad in Tables 16 and 17. As soo n in Tal>lG 16, the statewide average for t>OOget surpl us was 20.7% (0.207) aoo the surpu s calculation for plaintat districts was 23.3%. The su rpluses reponed for comparison disIricts aoo oo npla intiff d istricts were approxim at el~ 19°1. each Again, ~ woLJd appear \hal plaintiff districts were no! su1f<;iently harmed so as to affect their budget surpl us which, as a groop, was the highest in the state. As seen in Table 17 , the a"",rage difterefICe between plaintiff and rx>npIaintilf surpl>ws was in fact statisticaly sign if<;anl. Statestical signif<;ance, howe.er, augurad again st plaintiffs since that group ca rried higher mean budget su rpluses. Conseq ue ntly while differenc~s in wealth, ~xpe n d i · lute. tax a1lort aM bt.<:\get surplus dkj in lact exist, ~ was appare<1t that no i:lantifiable harm f,"1 to mambers of th e plaintift group.
In a sit""t"'" wher~ plaintiffs had higher wealth. hlgle r expenditures per pupil. aM sim l ar tax eftol1 wh i e maintairMng larger bodget su,pluses, it was enti rely reasonable 10 cooclude that the Montana sclYXli l inance to rmuta had protecled local taxpayers from the need for e'''''$SNe tax rates to support quality educatmal programs am wrvices.
"
